

## Message Text

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PM/MR STERN

L:MR FELDMAN

S/S:WHLUERS

S-MR EAGLEBURGER

ANALYSIS NOTE: REENTERED FOR OMITTED LINE.

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

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STADIS//////////

EXDIS, TOSEC 227

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:MPOL, NATO, TU

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM: TURKISH POSITION ON US AID

CUT-OFF (S/S-7503189)

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

REF: USNATO 702; ANKARA 1187 AND 1188

1. AS REPORTED REFTELS, TURKS HAVE RESPONDED TO OUR CUT-OFF OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN PART BY COMPLAINING THAT WE HAVE COME TO THE VERGE OF UNILATERALLY ABROGATING ARTICLE 3 OF NATO TREATY; BY LABELING US ACTION "AN EMBARGO;" AND BY SUGGESTING THAT US ACTION CALLS INTO QUESTION US-TURKISH BILATERAL DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT.

(ARTICLE 3 OF NATO TREATY READS: QUOTE IN ORDER MORE EFFECTIVELY TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS TREATY, THE PARTIES, SEPARATELY AND JOINTLY, BY MEANS OF CONTINUOUS

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AND EFFECTIVE SELF-HELP AND MUTUAL AID, WILL MAINTAIN AND

DEVELOP THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE CAPACITY TO RESIST ARMED ATTACK. UNQUOTE).

2. IN OUR VIEW, GOT ACTION IS IN PART AN EFFORT TO PUT IT IN POSITION TO DEMONSTRATE TO TURKISH PUBLIC THAT IT IS "DOING SOMETHING" ABOUT THE AID CUT-OFF.

3. IN OUR VIEW, THE US RESPONSE SHOULD BE FAIRLY PROMPT AND DESIGNED TO:

--STIMULATE ALLIES TO MEET TURKISH EQUIPMENT SHORTFALL RESULTING FROM US AID SUSPENSION.

--ALLOW US TO STATE OUR INTEREST IN HELPING TURKEY.

--AVOID GETTING BOGGED DOWN IN FECKLESS EFFORTS TO INTERPRET THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, A PROCESS WHICH RISKS UNDESIRABLE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES.

4. TO ACHIEVE THIS, WE RECOMMEND THAT US AGREE TO HAVE THE DPC DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF AID TO TURKEY, BUT NOT, HOWEVER, BY PONDERING THE MERITS OF THE TURKISH ARGUMENT ABOUT THE TREATY. IN OUR APPROACH, THE DPC WOULD BE ASKED RATHER TO CONSIDER THE MANNER IN WHICH TURKEY'S NEEDS FOR SPARE PARTS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT CAN BE MET BY OTHER ALLIES, BOTH FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF FINANCING AND FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SUPPLY. (THIS COULD BE A COMPLEX PROCESS: THE US WOULD HAVE TO STATE THAT IT IS UNABLE TO APPROVE TRANSFER BY ALLIES TO TURKEY OF US-ORIGIN EQUIPMENT REQUIRING USG APPROVAL BEFORE IT CAN BE TRANSFERRED TO THIRD COUNTRIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, A PRELIMINARY CHECK SUGGESTS THAT SOME SPARES FOR US-ORIGIN EQUIPMENT ARE BEING MANUFACTURED ABROAD UNDER COMMERCIAL LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH DO NOT REQUIRE USG APPROVAL OF SALES OR GRANT AGREEMENTS WITH NATO COUNTRIES.)

5. IN ADDITION TO FOCUSING ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE OF FUNDS AND SUPPLIES FOR TURKEY, DPC EFFORT WOULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING ADVANTAGES FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW.

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--ASSUMING DISCUSSIONS WERE BACKGROUNDED FOR PRESS, HEY WOULD ILLUSTRATE TO CONGRESS AND TO US AND ALLIED PUBLIC OPINION GENERALLY DEPTH OF ALLIED CONCERN OVER CONSEQUENCES OF AID CUT-OFF.

--IT COULD HELP TURKEY AND WOULD BRING OTHER ALLIES INTO PICTURE.

--THE ISSUE WOULD BE PLACED IN A FORUM IN WHICH WE HAVE  
PARAMOUNT INFLUENCE AND IN WHICH MORE EXTREME TURKISH  
DEMANDS ARE LIKELY TO BE MODERATED BY EXPECTATION OF  
CRITICISM BY OTHER NATO GOVERNMENTS. (GREECE HAS OPTED  
OUT OF THE DPC).

--TIME WILL BE BOUGHT AND ALLOW US TO ARGUE WITH TURKEY  
THAT IT SHOULD FOREGO ANY FAR-REACHING DECISIONS  
REGARDING ITS NATO COMMITMENTS AND TIES TO THE US  
UNTIL THE DPC -- THE FORUM OF ITS CHOICE -- HAS  
CONCLUDED ITS WORK.

--WE WILL BE ABLE TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON WHAT THE TURKS  
SHOULD CONSIDER TO BE MOST IMPORTANT -- RECEIPT BY  
THEM OF MUNITIONS NEEDED TO FULFILL NATO OBLIGATIONS.

6. THERE ARE RISKS, HOWEVER, TO SUCH AN APPROACH:

--IF THE EFFORT RESULTS IN NO HELP TO TURKEY THEN IT  
MAY REACT AGAINST NATO AS AN ENTITY, AS WELL AS THE  
US.

--AT BEST, US WILL BE ABLE TO SHOW ONLY MARGINAL  
FLEXIBILITY IN ALLOWING MILITARY EQUIPMENT ORIGINATING  
IN THE US OR LICENSED FOR MANUFACTURE TO PROCEED  
TO TURKEY. SUCH A POSITION COULD LEAD OTHER ALLIES TO  
RETHINK THEIR DEPENDENCE ON THE US FOR MUNITIONS.

--THE TURKS MAY MISREAD THE US MOVE TO DPC AS AN EFFORT  
TO DUMP TURKEY ON THE OTHER ALLIES.

7. RECOMMENDATION: THAT YOU APPROVE THE DRAFT CABLE  
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WHICH FOLLOWS, ASKING AMBASSADOR BRUCE TO PROPOSE THAT  
DPC LOOK INTO HOW TURKEY CAN BE AIDED IN MEETING ITS  
NATO OBLIGATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF US CONGRESSIONAL  
ACTION AND AUTHORIZING AMBASSADOR MACOMBER TO INFORM  
THE TURKS OF OUR PROPOSED APPROACH.

8. BEGIN TEXT.

1. WE INTERPRET TURKEY'S REACTION IN DPC TO US AID  
CUT-OFF AS AN EFFORT ON ITS PART TO FURTHER DEMONSTRATE  
-- PARTLY FOR EVENTUAL PUBLIC CONSUMPTION -- THAT IT IS  
NOT POWERLESS TO RESPOND. IT MAY BE POSSIBLE, HOWEVER,  
TO TURN TURKISH INITIATIVE TO US -- AND TURKEY'S  
ADVANTAGE BY HAVING THE ALLIES PROMPTLY UNDERTAKE A  
STUDY OF HOW TURKEY'S NATO-RELATED MILITARY NEEDS CAN

BE MET BY THE ALLIES IN LIGHT OF THE ACTION BY THE US  
BY BE UNCOVERED WHICH WILL ASSIST TURKEY IN MAINTAIN-  
ING ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES. MOREOVER, DPC ATTENTION  
HOPEFULLY WOULD BE DIVERTED FROM UNPRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION  
OF LEGAL ISSUES TURKEY HAS RAISED.

2. FOR USNATO: ACCORDINGLY, PROCEEDING FIRST AS YOU  
DEEM APPROPRIATE WITH SYG LUNS AND THE TURKISH PERMEP,  
YOU SHOULD PROPOSE THAT ALLIES RESPOND TO TURKISH  
PRESENTATION AT FEBRUARY 10 DPC BY AGREEING PROMPTLY  
TO CONSIDER TURKEY'S NATO-RELATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT  
AND FUND NEEDS IN LIGHT OF ACTION TAKEN BY CONGRESS,  
WHICH REQUIRES US TO CUT OFF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. YOU  
MIGHT ELABORATE BY COMMENTING THAT:

--WE SEE THIS AS A WHOLLY PRACTICAL EFFORT ON PART OF  
DPC AND WE WILL COOPERATE TO THE FULL EXTENT ALLOWED  
BY US LAW.

--IN LATTER CONNECTION, THE ADMINISTRATION STRONGLY FAVORS  
RESUMPTION BY US OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO TURKEY. IN  
ITS ABSENCE, TURKEY IS LESS ABLE TO MEET ITS NATO  
COMMITMENTS AND CONSEQUENTLY THE OVERALL ALLIANCE DE-  
FENSE EFFORT IS HARMED. WE ARE WORKING URGENTLY TO  
PERSUADE CONGRESS TO RESCIND OR MODIFY PRESENT LEGIS-  
LATION, BUT WE CANNOT PREDICT TO WHAT EXTENT THE  
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ADMINISTRATION WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN THESE EFFORTS NOR  
WHEN CONGRESS WILL ACT.

--WE DO NOT CONSIDER IT ADVANTAGEOUS FOR TURKEY OR FOR  
THE OTHER ALLIES TO ENGAGE IN A DISCUSSION OF US  
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES OR OF WHETHER US OR TURKEY  
HAVE SOMEHOW FAILED TO ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE NORTH  
ATLANTIC TREATY. YOU SHOULD CONTINUE STRONGLY TO OPPOSE  
ANY SUCH LINE OF INQUIRY. (TO TURKISH PERMREP OR OTHER-  
WISE PRIVATELY YOU MIGHT ADD THAT FULL DISCUSSION OF  
LEGAL ISSUES WILL NECESSARILY RENEW DEBATE OVER TURKISH  
RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER US-TURKISH MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
AGREEMENTS.)

3. AS TO PRESS GUIDANCE, IF DPC ALLIES AGREE TO UNDER-  
TAKE EFFORT, IT WOULD BE USEFUL AT AN EARLY STAGE TO GO  
ON PUBLIC RECORD TO THAT EFFECT. ACCORDINGLY, AT  
SOME POINT, MISSION SHOULD PROPOSE THAT NATO PRESS  
SPOKESMAN BE AUTHORIZED TO STATE THAT DPC IS CONSIDERING  
HOW BEST TO MEET TURKEY'S NATO-RELATED NEEDS IN LIGHT  
OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE US PURSUANT TO ACT OF CONGRESS.

4. IN THE DAYS AHEAD, WE WILL BE PREPARING FOR YOU A  
MORE DETAILED RUNDOWN OF OUR CURRENT EFFORTS TO  
DEVELOP ACCEPTABLE LEGISLATION WITH CONGRESS. WE

WILL ALSO BE SENDING SPECIFICATIONS AS TO THIRD COUNTRY  
AND OTHER RESTRAINTS IMPOSED ON USG UNDER CURRENT LEGIS-  
LATION WITH RESPECT TO SHIPMENTS TO TURKEY.

5. FOR ANKARA: YOU MAY DRAW ON FOREGOING IN YOUR  
ONGOING DISCUSSIONS WITH GOT, ECEVIT, AND OTHER TURKISH  
LEADERS. END TEXT.

9. APPROVE

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## Message Attributes

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